Three Legal Systems, One Question: How the US, the EU and Hungary Define a Pyramid Scheme
A comparative review published by MLM Figyelő sets the US Federal Trade Commission's Koscot standard alongside the EU's Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and Hungary's domestic rules. Despite differing legal traditions, all three frameworks converge on a single question: whether participant compensation flows from real sales to end users or from recruiting new members.

The US approach: Koscot and the FTC guidance
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission applies the standard developed in the Koscot Interplanetary case (86 F.T.C. 1106, 1975) in its business guidance on multi-level marketing. The first version of that guidance was published in January 2018 and was most recently updated in April 2024.
Under the Koscot test, indicators of a pyramid scheme are present where participants pay money to the company in exchange for the right to sell a product and for the right to receive, for recruiting new members, rewards that are unrelated to sales to end users.
The FTC guidance expressly rejects the notion that a single percentage metric — such as the ratio of retail sales to total turnover — can by itself determine whether a system is lawful. According to the agency, neither the existence of a genuine product nor the presence of retail customers is in itself a guarantee of legality. The guidance also notes that purchases made by participants to satisfy their own genuine needs do not, on their own, indicate a problematic compensation structure.
The EU framework: the blacklist and C-515/12
In European Union law, Annex I to Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices — the so-called blacklist — sets out the practices that are considered unfair in all circumstances. Point 14 of that list covers pyramid promotional schemes.
The Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted point 14 in Case C-515/12, in a judgment delivered on 3 April 2014. According to that ruling, a pyramid promotional scheme qualifies as unfair in all circumstances only where it requires a financial contribution of any amount from the consumer as a condition of joining the scheme.
The Hungarian rules and the common denominator
In Hungary, the EU directive is transposed by Act XLVII of 2008 on the prohibition of unfair commercial practices against consumers (Fttv.). The annex to the Act, pursuant to Section 3(4), likewise contains the prohibition of pyramid promotional schemes, also as point 14. Beyond consumer protection law, Section 412 of the Hungarian Criminal Code (Btk.) regulates the organisation of a pyramid scheme as a separate criminal offence.
The MLM Figyelő article presents the three legal systems in a comparative table of legal sources: on the US side, the FTC Act, the Koscot standard and the 2024 FTC guidance; on the EU side, point 14 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29/EC and Case C-515/12; and on the Hungarian side, point 14 of the annex to the Fttv. and Section 412 of the Btk.
The article concludes that, across all three jurisdictions, the central question is the same: whether the reward due to a participant is tied to actual sales to end users or rather to the recruitment of new members.
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